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INTRODUCTION
Over forty-five years ago, Justice William Brennan, writing for a
majority of the Supreme Court observed, “The vagaries of eyewitness
identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with
1
instances of mistaken identification.” The advent of DNA exonera2
tions has only reinforced this insight. Indeed, in seventy-six percent
of the first 250 DNA exoneration cases, the exoneree was identified
3
by an eyewitness. According to the Innocence Project, “[e]yewitness
misidentification is the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions
4
nationwide.”
Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Supreme Court
defined the Due Process limitations on the admissibility of eyewitness
5
identifications. The Court ultimately settled on a test in Manson v.
6
Brathwaite. Since 1977, the Court’s test has been roundly criticized in
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United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
DNA testing began in the 1980s. Since that time, more than 250 people have been exonerated with the aid of DNA evidence. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT:
WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 5 (2011).
Id. at 48.
THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, EYEWITNESS MISIDENTIFICATION, http://www.innocenceproject.
org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
See e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972) (establishing a two-part test and identifying factors to be considered when evaluating the likelihood of misidentification); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 381–82 (1968) (considering eyewitness identification
in the context of due process); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301–02 (1967) (applying
the due process standard to photographic eyewitness identification procedures). A more
thorough discussion of the Supreme Court’s eyewitness identification opinions is provided infra pp. 860–66.
432 U.S. 98, 106 (1977) (“The admission of testimony concerning a suggestive and unnecessary identification procedure does not violate due process so long as the identifica-
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the legal7 and social science8 literature. Despite developments in social science that have augmented our understanding of eyewitness
9
identifications, the Supreme Court has failed to readdress the issue.
Some state supreme courts have responded to criticisms of the
Manson test by revising the due process tests under their state consti10
tutions to reflect developments in social science. Most notably, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey radically amended its due process test
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9

10

tion possesses sufficient aspects of reliability.”). The Court identified five factors for
courts to examine to determine whether an identification was sufficiently reliable:
the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the
witness’s degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the
criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation,
and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.
Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199–200.
See e.g., GARRETT, supra note 2, at 63 (describing the Supreme Court’s Manson test as
“toothless”); Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, Manson and Its Progeny: An Empirical Analysis of
American Eyewitness Law, 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 175, 191 (2012) (noting “unanimous
opposition” among legal scholars to the Supreme Court’s approach to eyewitness evidence); Margery Malkin Koosed, Reforming Eyewitness Identification Law and Practices to Protect the Innocent, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 595, 601 (2009) (excoriating the criminal justice
system for “continu[ing] to tolerate eyewitness identification procedures that gratuitously
increase the risk of convicting innocent persons”); Timothy P. O’Toole & Giovanna Shay,
Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited: Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to
Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 109, 121 (2006) (“The problems with
the Manson rule of decision are fairly obvious in light of the psychological research . . . .”); David A. Sonenshein & Robin Nilon, Eyewitness Errors and Wrongful Convictions: Lets Give Science a Chance, 89 OR. L. REV. 263, 274 (2010) (advocating for the abandonment of the Manson test); David E. Paseltiner, Note, Twenty-Years of Diminishing
Protection: A Proposal to Return to the Wade Trilogy’s Standards, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 583, 606
(1987) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s test does not meet its goals).
See e.g., Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and
the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 1, 1 (2009) (reviewing hundreds of studies and calling the Manson test into
question); Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for
Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 608 (1998) (“In legal theory, various
safeguards are presumed to be operating within the justice system to prevent miscarriages
of justice in the form of mistaken identification. These safeguards, however, fail to provide the intended protection.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 1 (1999), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf (noting that procedures developed by courts and other actors “have not integrated the growing body of psychological knowledge regarding eyewitness evidence with the practical
demands of day-to-day law enforcement”).
In 2012, the Court was presented with the opportunity to revise the Manson test in Perry v.
New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012). However, the Court decided that case on narrower
state action grounds, holding that “the Due Process Clause does not require a preliminary
judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness identification when the identification
was not procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement.” Id. at 730.
“It is elementary that States are free to provide greater protections in their criminal justice system than the Federal Constitution requires.” California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992,
1013–14 (1983).
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for the admissibility of eyewitness evidence in State v. Henderson.11 The
Supreme Court of Oregon recently followed suit by rejecting the
12
Manson test in State v. Lawson.
This Comment considers whether or not the United States Supreme Court should use social science evidence as a source for reinterpreting the Due Process Clause as expressed through the Manson
test. While many alternatives to the Manson test have been proposed
in the academic literature, relatively little attention has been paid to
the question of why social science findings are legitimate sources for
interpretation of the Constitution in the case of eyewitness identifica13
tions. The respondent and its amici argued in Perry that it would be
inappropriate for the Court to consider this evidence in defining the
14
due process limitation on eyewitness evidence. In light of these arguments, it is necessary, as a threshold matter, to defend the legitimacy of social science research as a source of constitutional interpretation.
I argue that the Supreme Court should consider social science evidence in its interpretation of the Due Process Clause as it relates to
11
12

13

14

27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012); see also United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 305 n.3 (4th Cir.
2013) (“The New Jersey and Oregon opinions represent a growing awareness that the
continuing soundness of the Manson test has been undermined by a substantial body of
peer-reviewed, highly reliable scientific research.”).
Another student note has addressed the propriety of using social science evidence in assessing the due process standard for the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence. Michael R. Headley, Note, Long on Substance, Short on Process: An Appeal for Process
Long Overdue in Eyewitness Lineup Procedures, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 681 (2002). Headley relies
on an appeal to the philosophy of John Rawls to argue that justice requires making eyewitness identifications fairer. Id. at 693–94. My Comment will not depend on (nor address) Rawlsian philosophy.
See Brief for Respondent at 42, Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) (No. 108974) (“[P]etitioner relies heavily upon the results of studies conducted by social scientists to argue that identification evidence is generally unreliable. . . . To the extent that
the petitioner’s arguments implicate state evidentiary rules or undermine the weight that
identification evidence is assigned by the trier of fact in some cases, such rules and special
jury instructions adequately address the concerns that he has raised.”). In an amicus
brief, the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation argued at length that it would be inappropriate for the Court to refine the Manson test to conform to social science evidence. Brief
for The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at
17–18, Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) (No. 10–8974). They argued that it
was inappropriate to base a “constitutional rule” on a “‘decades-long research effort’ . . . which has resulted in varying conclusions and recommendations.” Id. at 17–18.
They went on to argue that “[t]he changeable nature of the science is reflected in scientific literature,” id. at 20, and that “[t]he research and theories are not solid enough on
which to rest a constitutional standard,” id. at 24. They concluded that, “even if the scientific and investigative community could agree on a process for obtaining the more reliable identifications, the courts are not commanded to accept the procedures as a requirement of due process.” Id. at 24–25. I address these objections infra.
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eyewitness testimony and revise the Manson test accordingly. In Part
I, I outline the Supreme Court’s eyewitness identification case law. In
Part II, I discuss the approaches of state supreme courts that have
augmented the federal standard. In Part III, I provide a framework
for the use of social science data in constitutional interpretation generally, paying particular attention to the work of David L. Faigman.
In Part IV, I apply the principles outlined in the prior part to eyewitness identifications, arguing that social science evidence is particularly relevant to this area of the law. Finally, I consider and reject some
objections to the Court’s use of scientific evidence to shape the test
for excluding eyewitness evidence.
I. U.S. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
Beginning in the 1960s the U.S. Supreme Court constitutionalized
restrictions on the admissibility of eyewitness evidence through the
Due Process Clause. This line of cases culminated in Manson v.
15
Brathwaite, which established the current due process test for assessing such evidence.
A. The Wade Trilogy
The Supreme Court first considered the reliability of eyewitness
identifications in the context of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of
16
the right to counsel. The Court decided three cases on the same
day, each of which contained a challenge to the admission of evi17
dence of lineups conducted in the absence of the defense counsel.
In Wade, the Court held that a pretrial identification was a “critical
stage” of the prosecution, at which defendants are entitled to have
18
counsel present. Recognizing the unreliability of eyewitness identifications, the Court observed, “[T]here is grave potential for prejudice, intentional or not, in the pretrial lineup, which may not be capable of reconstruction at trial, and . . . presence of counsel itself can
often avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at tri19
al.”
15
16
17
18
19

432 U.S. 98 (1977).
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 220–21 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263,
271–72 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 295–96 (1967).
388 U.S. at 236–37.
Id. at 235–36; see also id. at 228 (“[T]he confrontation compelled by the State between the
accused and the victim or witnesses to a crime to elicit identification evidence is peculiar-
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The Court did not, however, require that identifications made at
20
uncounseled lineups be excluded per se. Instead, the Court allowed
“the Government the opportunity to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identifications were based upon obser21
vations of the suspect other than the lineup identification.” If the
government could make such a showing, the evidence would not be
22
excluded.
The same day that the Court decided Wade, it applied its holding
23
in Gilbert v. California. The Court held that it was “constitutional error” to admit “in-court identifications without first determining that
they were not tainted by the illegal lineup but were of independent
24
origin.” The Court then held that the State was entitled to present
evidence to prove that the eyewitnesses had “independent source[s]”
for their in-court identifications of the defendant and remanded the
case to the California Supreme Court to hold “such proceedings as
[that court] may deem appropriate to afford the State the opportuni25
ty” to establish an independent source for the identification. The
Court also held that the witness’s testimony regarding his out-of-court
identifications was per se inadmissible and would result in reversal,
unless the California Supreme Court determined that the admission
26
was harmless error.
In Stovall v. Denno, the Court held that the Wade and Gilbert deci27
sions would not be applied retroactively. As such, the Court did not
apply Wade to the petitioner’s case, since he raised his claims on a pe28
tition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court also, for the first time,
29
considered the due process implications of the admission of eyewitness evidence. The petitioner claimed, “[T]he confrontation conducted in this case was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

ly riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair trial.”).
Id. at 239–40.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 239–40.
388 U.S. 263, 265 (1967).
Id. at 272.
Id.
Id at 272–74.
388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967).
Id. at 301.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).

866

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16:3

irreparable mistaken identification that he was denied due process of
30
law.”
In Stovall, the victim Dr. Frances Behrendt was stabbed eleven
31
Two days after the stabbing, the defendant, Theodore
times.
Stovall, was brought to the hospital where Behrendt was recovering
32
Stovall was handcuffed to a police officer and
from surgery.
33
brought into Behrendt’s room. He was the only black person pre34
35
sent. Behrendt identified Stovall as the perpetrator.
The Court, without citing any authority, stated that “a claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of a confrontation de36
pends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding it.” The
Court quoted the underlying opinion from the court of appeals and
37
noted that under these circumstances, the showup employed in this
case was necessary and therefore, the admission of evidence derived
38
from it did not constitute a due process violation.

30
31
32
33
34
35
36

37

38

Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301–02.
Id. at 295.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 302. The Court stated that a claim that “the confrontation . . . was so unnecessarily
suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that he was denied due
process of law” was “a recognized ground of attack upon a conviction independent of any
right to counsel claim.” Id. at 301–02. However, it cited only a single Fourth Circuit
case, Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966), in support of this proposition. In
Palmer, the Court relied on the principle that a court may not “rely on an identification
secured by a process in which the search for truth is made secondary to the quest for a
conviction” without violating due process. Id. at 202. The court cited no authority for
this proposition. Id. In his merits brief, Stovall cited only a Canadian case in support of
his argument that the identification to which he was subject violated due process. Brief
for Petitioner at 14–15, Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (No. 254) (citing Rex v.
Smierciak, [1947] 2 D.L.R. 156, 157–58 (Can. Ont.)).
A “showup” is “[a] pretrial identification procedure in which a suspect is confronted with
a witness to or the victim of a crime. Unlike a lineup, a showup is a one-on-one confrontation.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1506 (9th ed. 2009).
Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302. The Court considered these factors in its totality analysis:
Here was the only person in the world who could possibly exonerate Stovall. Her
words, and only her words, ‘He is not the man’ could have resulted in freedom for
Stovall. The hospital was not far distant from the courthouse and jail. No one
knew how long Mrs. Behrendt might live. Faced with the responsibility of identifying the attacker, with the need for immediate action and with the knowledge that
Mrs. Behrendt could not visit the jail, the police followed the only feasible procedure and took Stovall to the hospital room. Under these circumstances, the usual
police station line-up, which Stovall now argues he should have had, was out of the
question.
Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Stovall v. Denno, 355 F.2d 731, 735 (1966)).
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B. Developments in the Due Process Exclusion of Eyewitness Evidence
Just one year after the Wade trilogy was decided, the Court revisited and developed the due process status of eyewitness evidence in
39
In Simmons, eyewitnesses had identified
Simmons v. United States.
40
photographs of the petitioners. Thomas Simmons claimed, “[I]n
the circumstances the identification procedure was so unduly preju41
dicial as fatally to taint his conviction.” As in Stovall, the Court evaluated Simmons’s claim in light of the “totality of the surrounding cir42
cumstances.”
The Court listed some of the conditions that may lead to an im43
The Court found, however, that crossproper identification.
examination would be sufficient to remedy most of the dangers of er44
Thus, under the totality of the circumroneous identifications.
45
stances, Simmons’s due process rights had not been violated and
that the identification procedure was not “unnecessary” since “[a] serious felony had been committed” and “[t]he perpetrators were still
46
at large.” Moreover, the Court concluded, “[T]here was in the circumstances of this case little chance that the procedure utilized led to
47
misidentification of Simmons.” This was because the lighting dur48
49
ing the robbery was good, the robbers were not disguised, five wit50
nesses identified Simmons, the photographs were shown to the wit51
nesses “while their memories were still fresh,” and law enforcement
did not suggest to the defendants which people in the photographs
52
were under suspicion.
53
The next year, in Foster v. California, the Court held, for the first
time, that a lineup was so unfair as to violate due process. In Foster,
39
40
41
42
43

44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
Id. at 382.
Id. at 383.
Id.
These included viewing the perpetrator for a short period of time; showing the witness a
single photograph resembling their description; and the police telling the witness that
they have corroborating evidence. Id. at 383–84 (citing PATRICK M. WALL, EYE-WITNESS
IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 74–77, 82–83 (1965)).
Id. at 384.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 385.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
394 U.S. 440, 442–43 (1969).
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the petitioner was the only person in the lineup wearing a leather
54
jacket similar to that worn by the perpetrator. The witness was unable to make an identification, so the police set up a one-on-one con55
frontation between the witness and the petitioner. The witness was
56
still unable to make an identification. The police conducted another lineup three days later. The petitioner was the only person who
57
was in both lineups. Only at this second lineup was he identified.
Under these circumstances, the Court held, “The suggestive elements
in [the] identification procedure made it all but inevitable that [the
eyewitness] would identify petitioner whether or not he was in fact
58
‘the man.’” As such, the Court held that the procedure was so unnecessarily suggestive as to violate the defendant’s due process
59
rights.
The Court substantially refined the test, establishing the contem60
According to the majority,
porary standard, in Neil v. Biggers.
“[s]ome general guidelines” could be gleaned from the Court’s pre61
vious cases. First, according to the Court, its past judgments were
62
intended to avoid misidentifications. A showing of suggestiveness
was not, however, sufficient for a court to exclude the challenged evi63
dence. The Court held that eyewitness evidence should be admitted
if “under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ the identification was re64
liable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive.”
The Court then listed five factors to use in determining whether an
identification is sufficiently reliable to be admitted in spite of a suggestive identification procedure: (1) the opportunity of the witness
to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’s degree
of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the
criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the

54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id.
Id. at 443.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
409 U.S. 188, 198–200 (1972).
Id. at 196–98.
Id. at 198.
Id at 198–99.
Id. at 199.
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confrontation.65 The Court failed to cite any sources for these fac66
tors.
The Court’s final distillation of the due process test for the exclusion of eyewitness evidence came in Manson v. Brathwaite, where it
67
clarified that the test consisted of two parts. Evidence of an eyewitness identification is not excluded “per se” when the defendant shows
68
According to the
that the lineup was impermissibly suggestive.
Court, “[R]eliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility
69
of identification testimony.” Therefore, the Court should examine
the totality of the circumstances, focusing on the factors outlined in
Biggers in order to determine whether the evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted, despite the use of a suggestive identification pro70
cedure.
Since 1977, the Court has not revised its due process test, despite
71
numerous calls for it to do so. In 2012, the Court declined to read72
dress the Manson framework in Perry v. New Hampshire. Justice Sonia
Sotomayor, in dissent, noted that “[a] vast body of scientific literature
65
66

67
68
69

70
71
72

Id. at 199–200.
The Court may have been influenced by its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Two
years prior to Biggers, the Court had engaged in a similar analysis in its interpretation of
the Confrontation Clause in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88–89 (1970). According to the
Court, a declarant’s statements could be introduced even when the defendant had no
opportunity to confront the declarant if they carried sufficient “indicia of reliability.” Id.
at 89. In Dutton, the disputed statement was one that identified the defendant. Id. at 88.
According to the Court, “there was no denial of the right of confrontation as to this question of identity,” since “the statement contained no express assertion about past fact,” the
declarant had “personal knowledge” of the identity of the defendant, “the possibility that
[the declarant’s] statement was founded on faulty recollection [was] remote in the extreme,” and the “circumstances” gave no reason to suppose that the declarant was lying.
Id. at 88–89. As in Biggers, the Court did not cite any sources to support its determination
that these factors were indeed indicative of reliability. Cf. 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A
TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA 153 (2d ed. 1923) (“The theory of the Hearsay rule . . . is that the
many possible sources of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness which may lie underneath the
bare untested assertion of a witness can best be brought to light and exposed, if they exist, by the test of cross-examination. But this test or security may in a given instance be
superfluous; it may be sufficiently clear, in that instance, that the statement offered is free
from the risk of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness, so that the test of cross-examination
would be a work of supererogation.”).
432 U.S. 98 (1977).
Id. at 109, 113–14.
Id. at 114. That is to say, a defendant’s due process rights are not violated simply by being
subject to a suggestive police procedure. Due process is subverted only when that procedure results in the admission of unreliable evidence at trial.
Id.
See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
132 S. Ct. 716, 724–25 (2012).
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has reinforced every concern our precedents articulated nearly a half73
century ago.” She went on to observe,
The empirical evidence demonstrates that eyewitness misidentification is the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions in this country.
Researchers have found that a staggering 76% of the first 250 convictions
overturned due to DNA evidence since 1989 involved eyewitness misidentification. Study after study demonstrates that eyewitness recollections
are highly susceptible to distortion by postevent information or social
cues; that jurors routinely overestimate the accuracy of eyewitness identifications; that jurors place the greatest weight on eyewitness confidence
in assessing identifications even though confidence is a poor gauge of accuracy; and that suggestiveness can stem from sources beyond police74
orchestrated procedures.

In spite of these observations, Manson continues to provide the
test that federal courts use in assessing the constitutionality of admitting eyewitness evidence.
II. STATE SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
Some state supreme courts have modified the United States Su75
preme Court’s test. New York and Massachusetts courts adopted the
“per se” exclusionary rule that the United States Supreme Court rejected in Biggers. With regards to eyewitness evidence, the New York
Court of Appeals has “interpreted the Due Process Clause of the New
York Constitution differently” from the way the United States Su76
preme Court has interpreted the United States Constitution. Evidence of an out-of-court identification derived from a suggestive
77
lineup procedure is excluded per se. However, witnesses are permitted to identify the defendant in court “if that identification is
78
based on an independent source.” The test in Massachusetts is the
79
same.

73
74
75

76
77
78
79

Id. at 738 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 738–39 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See O’Toole & Shay, supra note 7, at 115 (“Some state courts have attempted to respond
to the criticism of Manson by interpreting their state constitution or other state law to
provide more protection than Manson.”).
People v. Marte, 912 N.E.2d 37, 39 (N.Y. 2009).
People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 384 (N.Y. 1981).
Id.
See Commonwealth v. Watson, 915 N.E.2d 1052, 1060 (Mass. 2009) (“If a defendant sustains his burden of showing that a given identification was unnecessarily suggestive, then
the Commonwealth may not introduce a subsequent identification by the same witness
absent clear and convincing evidence that the subsequent identification had an independent source and was not merely the product of the prior suggestive confrontation.”).
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A few states have responded more directly to criticism of Manson.
Kansas and Utah have adopted tests that are similar to the Manson
test, but have made modifications to the factors to be considered under the totality of the circumstances. The Utah Supreme Court, in
State v. Ramirez, adopted the following five-factor test in place of the
Manson test:
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event;
(2) the witness’s degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event;
(3) the witness’s capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the witness’s identification was made
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed
and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate
it correctly. This last area includes such factors as whether the event was
an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was ob80
served, and whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer’s.

The Kansas Supreme Court adopted the Ramirez test in State v. Hunt.81
The Wisconsin Supreme Court abandoned the Manson test in State
82
v. Dubose. The court began its analysis by recognizing the “new in83
formation” that had been assembled in the social science literature
and cited evidence from that literature calling into question the Man84
85
son test. “In light of such evidence,” the court adopted a new test.
According to the court, “[E]vidence obtained from an out-of-court
showup is inherently suggestive and will not be admissible unless,
based on the totality of the circumstances, the procedure was neces86
sary.” The court explained, “A showup will not be necessary, however, unless the police lacked probable cause to make an arrest or, as a

80
81
82
83
84

85
86

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493
(Utah 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
69 P.3d 571, 576 (Kan. 2003).
699 N.W.2d 582, 594 (Wis. 2005).
Id. at 591–92.
Id. (citing Tiffany Hinz & Kathy Pezdek, The Effect of Exposure to Multiple Lineups on Face
Identification Accuracy, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185 (2001); Nancy Steblay et al., Eyewitness
Accuracy Rates in Police Showup and Lineup Presentations: A Meta-Analytic Comparison, 27 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 523 (2003); Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the
Suspect”: Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360 (1998); Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 277 (2003); Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures:
Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 L. & HUMAN BEHAV. 603 (1998); Winn S.
Collins, Comment, Improving Eyewitness Evidence Collection Procedures in Wisconsin, 2003 WIS.
L. REV. 529; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf.; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 8).
Dubose, 699 N.W.2d at 592–93.
Id. at 593–94.
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result of other exigent circumstances, could not have conducted a
87
lineup or photo array.”
Perhaps the most significant reforms are those adopted by the Su88
preme Court of New Jersey in State v. Henderson. The court, in considering whether to amend its due process test, appointed a Special
Master to “evaluate scientific and other evidence about eyewitness
89
identifications.” The Special Master heard testimony from seven
experts and reviewed hundreds of scientific studies, which produced
90
2,000 pages of transcripts. Based on this evidence, the court concluded, “[T]he current standard for assessing eyewitness identification evidence does not fully meet its goals. It does not offer an adequate measure for reliability or sufficiently deter inappropriate police
conduct. It also overstates the jury’s inherent ability to evaluate evidence offered by eyewitnesses who honestly believe their testimony is
91
accurate.”
The court then proceeded to review, in detail, the scientific literature relating to eyewitness identifications. In light of this evidence,
the court fashioned a new test. “First, . . . a defendant has the initial
burden of showing some evidence of suggestiveness that could lead to
92
a mistaken identification.” Second, “the State must then offer proof
to show that the proffered eyewitness identification is reliable—
93
accounting for system and estimator variables.” Third, “the ultimate
burden remains on the defendant to prove a very substantial likeli94
hood of irreparable misidentification.” Then, “if after weighing the
evidence presented a court finds from the totality of the circumstances that [the] defendant has demonstrated a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, the court should suppress the
95
identification evidence.”
More important than changing the structure of the test, the New
Jersey Supreme Court identified a number of variables that social scientists have shown to be more closely tied to reliability for trial courts
to examine in their “totality of the circumstances” inquiries. These
include (1) blind administration, (2) pre-identification instructions,
(3) lineup construction, (4) feedback, (5) recording confidence, (6)
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Id. at 594.
27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
Id. at 877.
Id.
Id. at 878.
Id. at 920.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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multiple viewings, (7) showups, (8) private actors, (9) other identifications made, (10) stress, (11) weapon focus, (12) duration, (13) distance and lighting, (14) witness characteristics, (15) characteristics of
96
the perpetrator, (16) memory decay, and (17) race-bias. These reforms were significant and based on a substantial degree of factfinding by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of Oregon has also recently amended its due
process test for eyewitness identifications in response to social science
97
criticism of the Manson test. The court revised its test to accommodate “considerable developments in both the law and the science on
which this court previously relied in determining the admissibility of
98
eyewitness identification evidence.” The court recognized, “Since
1979, . . . there have been more than 2,000 scientific studies conduct99
ed on the reliability of eyewitness identification,” and took “judicial
100
The court, however, revised its
notice” of this social science data.
101
test based on evidentiary, rather than due process, grounds.
As discussed supra, the United States Supreme Court has refused
to acknowledge the social science data that calls into question the efficacy of its due process test. It has not, as the state supreme courts of
New York, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Kansas, Utah, New Jersey, and
Oregon have done, reevaluated its standards for the exclusion of unreliable eyewitness evidence. The rest of this Comment will argue
that the Supreme Court should reassess the Manson test in light of
this data.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR USING SOCIAL SCIENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
A. History of the Use of Social Science in Constitutional Interpretation
The United States Supreme Court has only recently begun to con102
sider social science in interpreting the Constitution. Before the
1920s, the Court’s formalist normative commitments excluded social
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

Id. at 920–22.
State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012).
Id. at 678.
Id. at 685.
Id.
Id. at 696–97.
According to Amy Rublin, “‘Social science’ refers to the work of people from myriad
fields who utilize different methods to analyze and explain social phenomena and rest
their explanations on a scientific basis.” Amy Rublin, The Role of Social Science in Judicial
Decision Making: How Gay Rights Advocates Can Learn from Integration and Capital Punishment
Case Law, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 179, 179–80 (2011).

874

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16:3

science as a relevant area of judicial inquiry.103 Michael Rustad and
Thomas Koenig argue that the rise of the realist movement changed
104
In his famous article The Path of the Law, Oliver
this paradigm.
Wendell Holmes, Jr. heralded the paradigm shift, declaring,
For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of
the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the
master of economics. It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of
105
law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.

Early proponents of using social sciences in the law included Hugo
106
Mustenberg, Karl Llewellyn, and Benjamin Cardozo.
107
In a brief filed in Muller v. Oregon, Louis Brandeis used social
science evidence to argue in favor of the constitutionality of a law lim108
After Muller, the Court grew more
iting women’s working hours.
receptive to using social science evidence in constitutional interpreta109
110
tion. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court relied on social sci111
ence studies to justify its holding. Since Brown, the Court has relied
on social science data in decisions “concerning school desegregation,
obscenity, segregation by gender, jury size, discriminatory death penalty, death-qualified juries, juvenile delinquency, discrimination, and
112
Eighth Amendment death penalty challenges.”

103
104

105
106
107
108

109

110
111
112

Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 100–01 (1993).
Id. For a more thorough examination of realist jurisprudence, see generally BRIAN Z.
TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING
(2010).
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
Henry F. Fradella, A Content Analysis of Federal Judicial Views of the Social Science “Researcher’s
Black Arts,” 35 RUTGERS L.J. 103, 106 (2003).
208 U.S. 412 (1908).
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 103, at 105–06. The “Brandeis brief” included “extracts
from over ninety reports of committees, bureaus of statistics, commissioners of hygiene,
inspectors of factories, both in this country and in Europe, to the effect that long hours of
labor are dangerous for women, primarily because of their special physical organization.”
Muller, 208 U.S. at 420 n.1. For an examination of Muller from a feminist perspective, see
Sybil Lipschultz, Social Feminism and Legal Discourse: 1908–1923, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
131, 134–39 (1989).
See Fradella, supra note 106, at 107 (“Largely as a result of the changes that occurred as a
function of the New Deal, ‘[b]y the 1930’s, classifying social science as fact was deeply ingrained in the thinking of the Court,’ and the amicus brief became the mechanism for
receiving social fact into judicial decision-making.” (quoting John Monahan & Laurens
Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U.
PA. L. REV. 477, 481 (1986))).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Fradella, supra note 106, at 107.
Id. at 108 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Most recently, the Court has relied on social science evidence to
113
develop the restrictions the Eighth Amendment places on the punishment of juvenile criminal offenders. In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that it was impermissible under the Eighth
Amendment to execute a juvenile offender who was older than fifteen but younger than eighteen when he committed a capital
114
According to the Court, in construing the prohibition
crime.
against cruel and unusual punishments, the Court must “refer[] to
‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’ to determine which punishments are so disproportionate
115
as to be cruel and unusual.”
The Court relied on social science evidence in order to determine
that “[t]hree general differences between juveniles under 18 and
adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be
116
classified among the worst offenders.” First, the Court determined
117
Next, it noted that juveniles
that juveniles are unusually reckless.
are “more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures” because they “have less control, or less experience with con118
trol, over their own environment.” Finally, the Court observed that
119
“[t]he personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.”
According to the Court, the differences between juveniles and
adults, illuminated by social science, “render[ed] suspect any conclu120
The Court,
sion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders.”
noting a rule “forbidding psychiatrists from diagnosing any patient
under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder,” held that “[i]f
trained psychiatrists with the advantage of clinical testing and observation refrain, despite diagnostic expertise, from assessing any juvenile under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder, we conclude
that States should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver con121
demnation—that a juvenile offender merits the death penalty.”

113
114
115
116
117
118

119
120
121

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
543 U.S. 551, 573–74 (2005).
Id. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
Id. at 569.
Id. (citing Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12
DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339 (1992)).
Id. (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)).
Id. at 570 (citing ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968)).
Id.
Id. at 573.
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The Court extended Roper to hold that a juvenile could not be
sentenced to life in prison without parole for a nonhomicide crime in
122
The Court reaffirmed the validity of the social
Graham v. Florida.
123
In Miller v. Alabama, the
science evidence that supported Roper.
Court held that juveniles could not be subject to a mandatory sentencing scheme that “mandates life in prison without possibility of
124
parole for juvenile offenders.” Again, the Court referenced the so125
cial science findings in Roper.
Despite this rise in the use of social science, some have argued
that the Court’s reliance on social science data is waning. After conducting an empirical study of Supreme Court decisions, Henry F.
Fradella concluded, “[I]t appears as if the heyday of social science as
persuasive evidence in courts of law is firmly in the past. Moreover, it
seems unlikely that the courts will re-embrace the social sciences in
126
Amy Rublin concludes that, in the area of gay
the near future.”
rights, “a growing national consensus is likely to be more persuasive
127
to the Court than social science findings.” However, she maintains
that “there is little doubt that social science will continue to influ128
ence” decisions about gay rights and other areas.

122
123

124
125
126
127

128

130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
Id. at 2026 (“No recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court’s observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles. As petitioner’s amici point out, developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and
adult minds.”).
132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
Id. at 2464 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
Fradella, supra note 106, at 170.
Rublin, supra note 102, at 220; see also Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
263, 263–64 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence tracks public opinion, but
proposing that the Justices do not directly respond to public opinion, but instead that
their views are shaped by the same forces that shape public opinion).
Rublin, supra note 102, at 222; see also Comm. on Psychosocial Aspects of Child & Family
Health, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Promoting the Well–Being of Children Whose Parents Are Gay
or Lesbian, 131 PEDIATRICS 827, 827 (2013) (supporting marriage equality as a matter of
policy in light of “extensive scientific literature” indicating that “children’s well-being is
affected much more by their relationships with their parents, their parents’ sense of
competence and security, and the presence of social and economic support for the family
than by the gender or the sexual orientation of their parents.” (citation omitted) (internal citations omitted)), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/early/
2013/03/18/peds.2013-0376.full.pdf+html.
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B. A Framework for the Use of Social Science Data in Constitutional DecisionMaking
Normative principles demand that the Supreme Court consider
social science evidence in some situations when interpreting the Constitution. David L. Faigman has developed a model for analyzing
when such evidence is an appropriate source of constitutional inter129
pretation. According to Faigman, “The role of social science in the
legal process remains confused . . . due to the lack of a standard by
130
Faigman’s basic framework is
which to measure its relevance.”
quite simple. He argues that the standard by which the general legal
relevance of social science research can be judged “should depend
on [its] scientific strength, that is, on the ability of social scientists to
131
answer validly the questions posed to them.”
Faigman, however, has a more specific view of when social science
research is an appropriate source for constitutional interpretation. He
identifies a number of sources of constitutional interpretation including “the text, original intent, precedent, constitutional scholarship,
132
Faigman emphasizes, however, that in
and contemporary values.”
interpreting the Constitution, the Court must engage in fact-finding.
It is in this fact-finding process that empirical research is relevant to
133
constitutional interpretation.
Faigman bases his analysis of “constitutional fact-finding” on the
134
Davis distinguished between
scholarship of Kenneth Culp Davis.
two kinds of facts: legislative and adjudicative. Legislative facts are
those that “inform legislative judgment,” that is, those facts that are
135
relevant to questions of “law or policy.” These facts are to be contrasted with “adjudicative facts.” According to Davis, “[F]acts concerning immediate parties—what the parties did, what the circumstances were, what the background conditions were— . . . may con136
conveniently be called adjudicative facts.”
129

130
131
132
133
134
135
136

See generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS (2008); David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”:
Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541
(1991); David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the
Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005 (1989).
Faigman, To Have and Have Not, supra note 129, at 1009.
Id. at 1009–10 (footnote omitted).
Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding,” supra note 129, at 548.
Id. at 551.
Id. at 552 (citing Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–03 (1942)).
Davis, supra note 134, at 402.
Id.
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Professor Faigman has built on this distinction. He refines the
category of legislative facts into categories of legislative facts particularly relevant for constitutional interpretation. According to Faigman, “Constitutional doctrinal facts are advanced to substantiate a par137
These facts go to the
ticular interpretation of the Constitution.”
meaning of the Constitution itself and include the text, original intent, constitutional structure, precedent, scholarship, and contempo138
Faigman then identifies “constitutional reviewable facts.”
rary values.
These facts are examined “under the pertinent constitutional rule or
standard to determine the constitutionality of some state or federal
action. Reviewable facts transcend particular disputes and thus can
139
Finally, “constitutional case-specific facts” are those that “are
recur.”
relevant to the application of constitutional rules in particular cas140
es.” Where the Court needs to answer empirical questions in order
to engage in constitutional fact-finding, it is appropriate for the
Court to consider social science evidence.
Professor Faigman argues that constitutional fact-finding is particularly appropriate in cases where there is “difficulty in choosing
141
Therefore, where
which constitutional principle to rely upon.”
there are overlapping constitutional principles, social science evidence may be particularly appropriate to constitutional interpretation. Faigman cites Brown as a primary example of this sort of case.
According to Faigman, “[No] traditional principle[] of constitutional
adjudication . . . squarely supports the decision and several indicate a
142
In this context, constitutional fact-finding filled
contrary result.”
the void created by the law and provided a basis for the Court’s decision.
IV. SOCIAL SCIENCE IS PARTICULARLY RELEVANT IN RESOLVING THE
APPROPRIATE DUE PROCESS TEST FOR THE ADMISSION OF EYEWITNESS
EVIDENCE
A. The Social Science Supporting a Change in the Manson Test Is Reliable
and Well-Established
As discussed supra, it is essential for Faigman that the social science that provides support for constitutional fact-finding must be re137
138
139
140
141
142

FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS, supra note 129, at 46.
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id. at 48.
Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding,” supra note 129, at 567.
Id.
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liable. Contrary to the assertions of respondent’s amici in Perry,143 the
reliability of the social science evidence with respect to eyewitness
identifications is unassailable. According to psychologist Gary Wells,
“[H]undreds of eyewitness experiments have been published in peer144
reviewed journals, many of which bear on issues in Manson.” These
studies are based on “the experimental model that psychology long
145
ago borrowed from other sciences, such as biology and physics.”
The generalizability of eyewitness evidence across age groups has
146
The reliability of research
been confirmed by empirical research.
concerning eyewitness evidence has also been recognized by numer147
ous courts. Professor Faigman described the “proliferation of stud148
ies on eyewitness identification.” And, “[U]nlike the study of complex legal and psychological issues, such as the coercive impact of
religiously inspired prayer at graduation ceremonies, eyewitness perception requires little legal sophistication and is relatively easy to re149
The scientific and legal consensus clearly demonstrates
search.”
that scientific research regarding eyewitness identification is sufficiently reliable to serve as the basis of a finding of constitutional fact.

143
144
145
146

147

148
149

See supra note 14.
Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 8, at 1.
Id. at 5.
Steven Penrod & Brian H. Bornstein, Generalizing Eyewitness Reliability Research, in 2 THE
HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 529, 538 (Rod C.L. Lindsay
et al. eds., 2007); Thomas E. O’Rourke et al., The External Validity of Eyewitness Identification
Research: Generalizing Across Subject Populations, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 385, 392 (1989).
See United States v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2009) (examining confidenceaccuracy relationship and effects of memory decay), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1137 (2010);
United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 142–44 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting the “inherent unreliability” of eyewitness identifications and the accuracy-confidence relationship); United
States v. Smith, 621 F.Supp. 2d 1207, 1215–17 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (discussing cross-racial
identifications, impact of high stress, and feedback); State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208,
1220–22 (Ariz. 1983) (discussing memory decay, stress, feedback, and confidenceaccuracy); People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1984) (“The consistency of the
results of [eyewitness identification] studies is impressive, and the courts can no longer
remain oblivious to their implications for the administration of justice.”), overruled on other
grounds by People v. Mendoza, 4 P.3d 265 (Cal. 2000); Benn v. United States, 978 A.2d
1257, 1265–68 (D.C. 2009) (citing expert consensus regarding system and estimator variables); State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 916 (N.J. 2011) (“We find that the scientific evidence presented is both reliable and useful.”); People v. LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d 374, 380
(N.Y. 2007) (discussing the confidence-accuracy relationship, feedback, and confidence
malleability); State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 299–300, 302 (Tenn. 2007) (discussing
weapons effect, stress, cross-racial identification, age, and opportunity to view); State v.
Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1113 n.22 (Utah 2009) (citing with approval research on multiple system and estimator variables).
FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS, supra note 129, at 28.
Id. at 29 (footnote omitted).
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B. Criminal Due Process Is Sufficiently Open-Ended to Make Reliance on
Constitutional Facts Desirable
As was true with the equal protection analysis in Brown and the
Eighth Amendment analysis in Roper, constitutional interpretation
surrounding criminal due process does not have a firm doctrinal
grounding. Niki Kuckes has examined the Supreme Court’s criminal
150
According to Kuckes, “While the Court’s
due process precedent.
civil and administrative precedents express a clear due process approach, . . . no single doctrinal approach to procedural due process
151
Kuckes goes on to
emerges from the Court’s criminal decisions.”
say, “[T]o the extent a dominant approach is reflected in the Court’s
recent criminal cases, it suggests that the process due in criminal cases should be heavily influenced by historic tradition, but this doctrine
has neither the clarity nor the consistency of the civil due process
152
test.”
This doctrinal confusion is reflected in the Court’s eyewitness
identification decisions. In Stovall, the Court described the petitioner’s challenge to the lineup on the grounds that it was so unnecessarily suggestive as to violate due process as a “recognized ground of at153
tack upon a conviction independent of any right to counsel claim.”
The only authority that the Court cited for this proposition was Palm154
155
The
er v. Peyton, a Fourth Circuit case from the previous year.
Court provided no rationale outside of this “recognized ground of attack” that the Due Process Clause could require the exclusion of evidence obtained from a suggestive eyewitness procedure.
The Court’s eyewitness identification due process jurisprudence is
part and parcel of its muddled approach to criminal due process
more generally. In this context, the traditional sources of authority
that inform the Court of constitutional doctrinal facts are unavailable. The Court has not said why, as a formal matter, a matter of
precedent, or a matter of original intent the Due Process Clause
means that unreliable evidence obtained through suggestive procedures should be excluded. If the Court had relied on one of these
more traditional sources of constitutional interpretation in establish-

150
151
152
153
154
155

Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2006).
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15–16 (footnote omitted).
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966).
Palmer, remarkably, cited no authority for the proposition that suggestive police procedures conducive to mistaken identifications could be violative of the Due Process Clause.
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ing the Manson test, modern courts might look to it assessing the continuing validity of the test.
In the absence of such a rationale, however, constitutional reviewable facts are the only ones available to resolve disputes over the
meaning of the Due Process Clause in this area. Since social science
evidence provides facts of this kind and the social science evidence in
the realm of eyewitness identification is reliable, it would be appropriate for the Court to consider it in refining the Manson test.
C. The Test Established by the Supreme Court Presents an Empirical Question
That Should Be Resolved by Social Science
Not only is the criminal due process jurisprudence vague enough
that social science evidence should be used to resolve the doctrine,
the test that the Supreme Court established for excluding eyewitness
evidence under the Due Process Clause creates empirical questions
that can best be resolved by reference to social science facts. According to Manson, there are two questions that need to be addressed in
order to decide whether the admission of eyewitness evidence will violate the Due Process Clause. First, the Court must decide whether
the pretrial procedure was “so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise
156
to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”
Second, the Court must decide whether the identification was suffi157
ciently reliable that its admission would not violate due process.
The first question can only be resolved with reference to constitutional reviewable facts. Courts must decide which procedures are so
suggestive that they give rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentification. The Constitution itself has nothing to say on this topic. At
this point, there may be sufficient precedent to guide lower courts in
determining which procedures are suggestive enough to satisfy the
test. However, the question is really an empirical one: what sorts of
identification procedures will lead to a risk that witnesses will make
false identifications?
This answer can be and has been answered by social scientists.
They have proved that undergoing multiple identification proce158
159
dures, seeing a mugshot before undergoing the procedure, failing
156
157
158
159

Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 122 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 106 (majority opinion).
Ryan D. Godfrey & Steven E. Clark, Repeated Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Memory,
Decision Making, and Probative Value, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 241, 256 (2010).
Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., Mugshot Exposure Effects: Retroactive Interference, Mugshot
Commitment, Source Confusion, and Unconscious Transference, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 287,
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to engage in “double blind” lineup procedures,160 failing to provide
161
unbiased pre-identification instructions, the construction of the
162
lineup, administrator feedback, having the witness compose a com163
164
posite, and presenting the witness with a “show-up” can affect the
likelihood that the witness will misidentify the suspect. These studies
go directly to answering an empirical question that is at the heart of
the constitutional analysis of what procedures violate due process. As
such, the Court should make use of them in analyzing this constitutional question.
Much the same can be said for the second part of the Manson inquiry. Lower courts are directed to decide “whether under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ the identification was reliable even though
165
According to the
the confrontation procedure was suggestive.”
166
Court, “reliability is the linchpin” of this analysis. The factors identified by the Court are intended to provide a guide to lower courts as
to what constitutional, case-specific facts they should adduce in order
to determine whether due process has been violated in a particular
case. However, the question of what factors, as part of a totality of the
circumstances, contribute to the reliability of a given identification is
empirical. It must be answered with reference to constitutional reviewable facts.
As in the first Manson prong, these facts about what makes a given
identification reliable have been established by reliable social science
167
research. Psychologists have identified weapons focus, presence of
168
169
170
a disguise, cross-racial identification, and stress as factors that

160

161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168

299 (2006); Charles A. Goodsell et al., Effects of Mugshot Commitment on Lineup Performance
in Young and Older Adults, 23 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 788, 789 (2009).
Sarah M. Greathouse & Margaret Bull Kovera, Instruction Bias and Lineup Presentation Moderate the Effects of Administrator Knowledge on Eyewitness Identification, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
70, 71 (2009).
Nancy Mehrkens Steblay, Social Influence in Eyewitness Recall: A Meta-Analytic Review of
Lineup Instruction Effects, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 283, 285–86, 294 (1997).
Wells & Bradfield, supra note 84, at 360.
Gary L. Wells & Lisa E. Hasel, Facial Composite Production by Eyewitnesses, 16 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 6, 6–7 (2007).
A. Daniel Yarmey et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications in Showups and Lineups, 20 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 459, 464 (1996).
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106 (1977) (quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199
(1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 114.
Nancy Mehrkens Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 413, 413 (1992).
BRIAN L. CUTLER & MARGARET BULL KOVERA, EVALUATING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 43
(2010); Brian L. Cutler et al., The Reliability of Eyewitness Identification: The Role of System
and Estimator Variables, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 233, 240, 244–45 (1987).
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affect the reliability of eyewitness identification. Moreover, social science research has revealed that one of the Biggers factors, certainty, is
171
not correlated with reliability. This reliable evidence has given clear
answers to the empirical question that the Manson test requires courts
to resolve. As such, these findings are relevant and should be relied
upon in judicial interpretation of the Due Process Clause.
The Court should look to social science research in interpreting
when the Due Process clause proscribes the admission of eyewitness
evidence. In general, criminal due process is not governed by clear
principles. More specifically, the Court did not cite traditional
sources of constitutional interpretation in establishing the Manson
test. As such, it is appropriate for the Court to engage in constitutional fact-finding to determine the meaning of the Due Process
Clause in the context of criminal due process. More specifically, the
Court’s precedent asks courts to make inquiries that can be illuminated by social science research. It is appropriate and normatively
desirable for the Court to use social science evidence in determining
the meaning of the Due Process Clause as it relates to eyewitness evidence.
V. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO USING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN THE
CONTEXT OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
A. Tying Constitutional Analysis to Scientific Findings Will Create an
Unstable Standard
Some have objected that tying constitutional principles to social
science findings creates a moving target that will render the law perpetually unsettled and will fail to provide guidance to lower courts
172
According to Professor Faigman, this critiand law enforcement.

169

170
171

172

Tara Anthony et al., Cross-Racial Facial Identification: A Social Cognitive Integration, 18
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 296, 299 (1992); Robert K. Bothwell et al., CrossRacial Identification, 15 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 19, 19, 23 (1989); Henry F.
Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Testimony,
2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 14 (2007).
Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress on Eyewitness Memory, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 687, 687, 699 (2004).
Neil Brewer & Gary L. Wells, The Confidence-Accuracy Relationship in Eyewitness Identification:
Effects of Lineup Instructions, Foil Similarity, and Target-Absent Base Rates, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 11, 11 (2006); Steven M. Smith et al., Postdictors of Eyewitness Errors:
Can False Identifications Be Diagnosed?, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 542, 548 (2000).
The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation made this very objection in its amicus brief in
support of the respondent in Perry. Brief of Amicus Curiae of The Criminal Justice Legal
Foundation in Support of Respondent at 24, Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716
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cism was leveled at Justice Harry Blackmun’s majority opinion in Roe
173
v. Wade. Faigman observes, “Critics complain that attaching constitutional meaning to scientific opinion, even when scientists are in
consensus, condemns the Constitution to fluctuations in meaning as
174
scientific knowledge changes.”
In Roe, the Court found that “the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and
175
must be considered against important state interests in regulation.”
The Court then held that “[w]ith respect to the State’s important and
legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of
176
Thus, a state could
meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.”
177
place limitations on abortion rights after the first trimester. Justice
Blackmun based his decision on scientific facts. He “immersed himself in research at the huge Mayo Clinic medical library” before writ178
Blackmun’s reliance on scientific principles was
ing his opinion.
widely criticized. In her dissent in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., Justice Sandra Day O’Connor argued that, due
to the developing nature of medical science, “[t]he Roe frame179
work . . . is clearly on a collision course with itself.”
Professor Faigman, however, has convincingly argued that
“Blackmun’s error in Roe does not come from attaching the fundamental right of choice to empirical fact, but rather from failing to
sufficiently articulate the constitutional principles underlying that
180
right.” As such, the constitutional standard itself was subject to fluctuation with any change in the empirical fact. Since there was no
clear constitutional principal, the only guidance lower courts had was
viability.

173
174
175
176
177
178

179
180

(2012) (No. 10-8974) (“The research and theories are not solid enough on which to rest
a constitutional standard.”).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding,” supra note 129, at 573.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
Id. at 163.
Id.
BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 229
(1979); see also LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S
SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 90 (2005) (“Blackmun visited the Mayo Clinic library, where
the staff had set aside a place for him to work and compiled a stack of books and articles
on the history and practice of abortion. In long-hand on a lined pad, he took careful
notes, numbering each factual assertion and marking the citation for each.”).
462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Factfinding,” supra n. 129 at 574.
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This is not a problem in the realm of eyewitness identification.
The Supreme Court has, in the case of the due process standard for
eyewitness identification, identified the principles that provide the
contours of the right at stake. Defendants have the right not to be
subject to suggestive procedures to the extent that they are likely to
produce unreliable identifications. Here, the empirical evidence will
not change the constitutional standard. Rather, as the Supreme
Court of New Jersey noted in Henderson, “The factors that both judges
and juries will consider are not etched in stone. We expect that the
181
scientific research underlying them will continue to evolve.” As the
Henderson court recognized, the Manson framework can accommodate changing social science discoveries without threat to the framework itself.
Moreover, courts are well equipped to stay abreast of this new evidence. As demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Graham,
the Supreme Court is fully capable of assessing the developments of
182
relevant social science. Since the science in this area is well settled
and changes to it will not affect the constitutional test itself, using social science to define suggestiveness and reliability will not create an
unduly unpredictable standard.
B. Judicial Activism
One may also argue that judges lack the institutional competence
to weigh and assess social science evidence; this is a task best left to
the legislature. The specter of judicial activism encompasses two
concerns. First, one might worry that judges are not competent to assess scientific facts. Second, one may worry that unelected judges are
not democratically accountable and, as such, are not the proper governmental actors to be assessing legislative facts and creating policy
around them.
The courts are entirely competent to make an assessment of the
social science evidence relevant to eyewitness identifications. Here,
courts are not being asked to make a policy judgment better suited to
a legislature. Rather, they are trying to adduce whether identifications in particular cases are reliable. Trial courts routinely assess the
validity of scientific evidence in the context of certifying expert witnesses. The Daubert standard requires courts to assess “whether the
[proffered] expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge
181
182

State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 878 (N.J. 2011).
See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (“No recent data provide reason to
reconsider the Court’s observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles.”).
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that (2) will assist the trier of fact.”183 In making this assessment, the
court must examine “whether the reasoning or methodology underly184
Courts have engaged in
ing the testimony is scientifically valid.”
this evaluation of scientific evidence for almost ten years.
The anti-democratic concern is also not compelling in the case of
eyewitness identifications. In his book, The Least Dangerous Branch:
The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, Alexander Bickel argued that
185
“judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system.” He
argued that judicial review was undemocratic, since, by allowing unelected judges to overturn legislation duly passed by a democratically
elected Congress, it “constitute[s] control by an unrepresentative mi186
nority of an elected majority.” In light of this worry, one might argue that even if judges are competent to analyze social science evidence, they should not do so; rather, limitations on eyewitness
evidence should be made by the people through the legislature.
This argument is unconvincing because the interests of those who
are protected by due process protections, people accused of committing crimes, are a minority and cannot adequately represent their interests in the legislative process. According to Erwin Chemerinsky,
“Constitutional law should begin with the idea that society should
have an institution, the Court, that is not popularly elected or directly
electorally accountable identify and protect values that are sufficiently important to be constitutionalized and safeguarded from political
187
majorities.”
The people whose rights are at stake in determining the proper
scope of criminal due process protections are criminal defendants.
They are precisely those people that a counter-majoritarian institu-

183
184
185
186
187

Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
Id. at 592–93.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1986).
Id.
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—Forward: The Vanishing Constitution,
103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 102 (1989). This view is reflected in the famous footnote four of
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., which called for greater judicial scrutiny of statutes that
target “discrete and insular minorities.” 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). John Ferejohn and
Pasquale Pasquino identify another benefit to counter-majoritarian Supreme Court rulings. According to them, “the countermajoritarian nature of judicial review is not a ‘difficulty,’ but an ‘opportunity.’ A countermajoritarian court can make it possible for a democracy to become more deliberative.” John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The
Countermajoritarian Opportunity, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 353, 360 (2010). On this view, a
counter-majoritarian ruling in favor of the rights of the accused would have the advantage of encouraging public deliberation on this issue.
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tion is best suited to protect.188 As such, this is an area where judicial
activism on the part of the Court is necessary, since the legislature will
be unable, due to its majoritarian commitments, to adequately protect the rights of criminal defendants.
CONCLUSION
It is entirely appropriate and normatively desirable for the Supreme Court to use social science evidence to amend the Manson test.
The Supreme Court’s precedents in this area do not adequately protect criminal defendants and have led to erroneous convictions.
Criminal due process is an area of constitutional interpretation that is
ideal for considering social science facts. Since the standards of criminal due process do not have firm grounding in traditional sources of
constitutional interpretation, social science can provide a powerful
tool in constitutional interpretation in this area.
Moreover, the Court has defined the test in such a way that empirical questions must be resolved in order to apply it. In doing so, the
Court has opened the door to social science research. Which procedures are suggestive and what factors contribute to the reliability of
an identification are empirical facts. These facts are necessary to interpreting the Constitution in the Court’s framework. In doing so,
the Court should not ignore a robust and reliable source for those
facts. Relying on social science in this area will not constitute a radical departure from the Court’s past practice. If there is an area
where social science has something to add to constitutional interpretation, this is it.
The Court is not at risk of creating an unstable standard, since
adoption of social science evidence will not necessarily call the standard itself into question. Finally, the Court has a duty to make use of
such facts in this area due to its counter-majoritarian obligations.
Other scholars have argued forcefully that the Manson test is deficient. The Court should not put on blinders and ignore the vast
body of knowledge developed by scholars in non-legal fields. In order to determine the contours of due process with regards to eyewitness evidence, the Supreme Court must look to social science.

188

See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 142–43 (2010) (describing the “collateral consequences” of criminal
convictions, including the loss of the right to vote).
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